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CONTENTS

10 FEBRUARY 1988

CANADA

Mulroney Says Cruise Tests To Continue; Press Responds	1
Mulroney Remarks [<i>Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL</i> , 10 Dec 87]	1
WINDSOR STAR Faults Reasoning [<i>Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR</i> , 15 Dec 87]	1
Vancouver SUN Urges Test Halt [<i>Vancouver THE SUN</i> , 15 Dec 87]	1
Reassessment of Conventional East-West Balance Examined [<i>Carol Goar; Windsor THE SATURDAY WINDSOR STAR</i> , 12 Dec 87]	2

CHINA

Roundup on Moscow's View of U.S. INF Debate [<i>Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service</i> , 31 Jan 88]	4
---	---

SOVIET UNION

Bessmertnykh on Reykjavik Summit, New Concepts [<i>A. A. Bessmertnykh; Moscow VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSR</i> , 10 Oct 87]	5
British MP David Owen Interviewed on INF [<i>David Owen Interview; Moscow NEW TIMES</i> , No 49; Dec 87]	8
Correspondent Assesses U.S. Reaction to Summit [<i>Alexander Pumpyansky; Moscow NEW TIMES</i> , No 51, Dec 87]	11
Indian VP Praises Gorbachev, USSR-U.S. Peace Efforts [<i>Shanker Dayal Sharma Interview; Moscow NEW TIMES</i> , No 51, Dec 87]	15
Western Europe Criticized for INF Stance [<i>Alexander Lebedev; Moscow NEW TIMES</i> , No 51, Dec 87] ..	15

WEST EUROPE

BELGIUM

Strategy After INF Agreement [<i>Pierre Cremer Commentary; Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE</i> , 17 Nov 87]	22
--	----

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher, Shevardnadze Give Dinner Speeches [<i>Hamburg DPA</i> , 18 Jan 88]	23
---	----

NETHERLANDS

Commentator on Soviet Superiority in Conventional Forces [<i>Frits Schalig; Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD</i> , 30 Nov 87]	24
--	----

PORTUGAL

NATO Seen Protecting Europe in Light of INF Agreement [<i>Victor Cunha Rego; Lisbon SEMANARIO</i> , 12 Dec 87]	25
--	----

TURKEY

Openness in Nuclear Policy Discussed [<i>Hasan Cemal Editorial; Istanbul CUMHURIYET</i> , 5 Jan 88]	26
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Mulroney Says Cruise Tests To Continue; Press Responds

Mulroney Remarks

52200010 *Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL* in English 10 Dec 87 p A13

[Text] Ottawa—Canada will not end its cruise-missile testing treaty with the United States despite the superpowers' agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said yesterday.

He took the stand despite opposition reminders that the Conservative Government has always linked continuation of the tests to progress in arms talks.

Mr Mulroney cited the need for unity within the NATO alliance as the main reason to continue the tests.

Mr Mulroney told reporters that the strength of the NATO alliance and its unity of purpose forced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to sign the treaty.

The treaty, signed on Tuesday in Washington by President Ronald Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, will eliminate a whole class of nuclear missiles, mostly deployed in Europe, with ranges of 500 to 5,000 kilometres.

WINDSOR STAR Faults Reasoning

52200010 *Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR* in English 15 Dec 87 p A6

[Text] The world may rejoice at the agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Washington summit, but Prime Minister Brian Mulroney does not believe the success in scrapping intermediate ballistic missiles is good reason to suspend cruise missile tests over Canada.

Mulroney is right. There is a treaty between Canada and the U.S. which allows the cruise tests in Canada's northern airspace, and unless Washington agrees to have it abrogated, or even suspended, Canada has an obligation to abide by it.

But the opposition in the Commons was also right when it reminded Mulroney that in the past he had deflected criticism on the cruise flights by stressing that the tests were necessary in the absence of an arms limitation agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. That agreement has now been signed.

Mulroney was wrong when he claimed that the reason for continuing the cruise tests is to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The tests have nothing to do with the unity of that alliance, and it is surprising that Mulroney was not aware of that.

Our prime minister indulged in a bit of wishful thinking when he told reporters the strength of NATO and its unity of purpose forced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to sign the medium range ballistic missile elimination treaty in Washington.

It takes utter ignorance and a very vivid imagination to believe that. Either the prime minister is very naive, or he thinks Canadian journalists are naive and uninformed.

In either case, it does not speak well of a man who would appropriate someone else's success for his own glorification.

Vancouver SUN Urges Test Halt

52200010 *Vancouver THE SUN* in English 15 Dec 87 p B6

[Text] The Canadian government has fulfilled its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by allowing the testing of cruise missiles and there should be no more tests in this country.

In 1983 the Trudeau government reached an agreement with the United States providing for weapons testing. The cruise was the first major weapon to be tested under the agreement—perhaps its very *raison d'être*. It has always been a highly controversial deal but it was explained by then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau as necessary to affirm our NATO contribution. It was also argued by proponents that the agreement was part of a general exercise of pressure on the Soviet Union to bargain for real arms reductions. (The popular phrase at the time was NATO's "two-track" arms negotiating policy.)

If either of these arguments was valid then, the cruise tests have now served their purpose. Canada remains four-square in NATO and the Soviets have reached an arms agreement with the U.S.

That agreement calls for the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Among these missiles is the ground-based cruise.

But Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has said that Canada will not end its cruise-testing agreement. He was quoted as saying that the need for unity within NATO was the main reason to continue tests and that Canada had to "assume our responsibilities in regard to the cruise."

If Mr Mulroney wishes to assume some responsibility, he should read the terms of the agreement signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. That agreement will become a treaty when ratified by the two countries. It says that after the treaty enters into force neither side may produce or flight-test any intermediate- or shorter-range missiles.

The two nations may, however, launch up to 100 such missiles during the first six months of the treaty—for the sole purpose of destroying them. Does Mr Mulroney propose to allow the Americans to destroy their cruise missiles over Canada (preferably Toronto, no doubt)?

Canada has already proved itself to be a good ally. It doesn't need to make a fool of itself over cruise missiles. It ought to be showing some leadership by announcing its intent to live by the spirit of the arms agreement right now. The prime minister's statement can best be described as hasty, and upon reflection he will surely want to change it.

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Reassessment of Conventional East-West Balance Examined

52200011 Windsor *THE SATURDAY WINDSOR STAR* 12 Dec 87 p A7

[Article by Carol Goar]

[Text] Ottawa—A change of thinking, almost as important as the will to scrap nuclear missiles, is quietly taking root in western defence councils.

Knowledgeable analysts—some in very high places—are beginning to doubt the wisdom of matching the Warsaw Pact man-for-man and tank-for-tank in Europe.

This re-assessment of the conventional military balance could be instrumental in determining the next step in the disarmament process launched by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington this week. And it could help define Canada's role in the post-summit world.

With both superpowers now formally committed to eliminating all of their intermediate range nuclear missiles, the focus will quickly shift to other types of weapons. Since conventional arms account for 80 percent of the world's military spending, they will occupy a pivotal place in the unfolding agenda.

"It's terribly important that the momentum be maintained," said Canada's Disarmament Ambassador Doug Roche in a recent interview. "And it will be difficult to make further advances before there is discernible progress on the question of conventional forces."

There has always been a good deal of skepticism about military bean-counting among peace activists and academics. But now, for the first time, it is beginning to show up in defence circles.

The breakthrough came last summer when U.S. joint chiefs of staff (the heads of the army, navy, airforce and marine corps) advised the Reagan Administration in a

classified military document, that NATO has sufficient conventional strength in Europe to deter a Soviet attack. Their assessment was leaked to the press in Washington last week.

It was the first clear public signal that, even within the military establishment, informed commentators are questioning the long-held tenet that the western alliance would be overwhelmed by the vastly superior East Bloc forces in a surprise attack.

"All of the sudden, the cries of gloom and doom that we'd been hearing for years didn't seem so credible anymore," said John Barrett, deputy director of Ottawa's Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

Although it is difficult for a layman to penetrate the conflicting claims emanating out Moscow and Washington, there are two generally acknowledged facts about global military strength:

- The first is that the Warsaw Pact has a considerable numerical advantage over NATO in manpower and conventional weapons. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, one of the most credible research agencies in the field, estimates in its latest study that the Warsaw Pact has a 200,000-man advantage in ground forces and 5,300 more battle tanks than NATO.
- The second is that NATO's troops are, for the most part, more professional, more flexible and better equipped than those of the East Bloc.

Until this fall, it was an article of faith among NATO members that The West had to beef up its conventional forces in Europe, particularly if the superpowers decided to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

Officially, this is still the line being taken by most western governments. U.S. Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci told reporters at last week's NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels that the alliance remains determined to upgrade and modernize its conventional forces in Europe. And Canadian Defence Minister Perrin Beatty affirmed that Ottawa intends [to] do its part to redress the imbalance.

But behind-the-scenes, an alternate view is emerging. A growing number of experts is demanding that NATO adopt a more sophisticated means of comparing the capabilities of the two opposing alliances.

"It makes no sense to compare gross numbers, as so many journalists and politicians do," said a report released last week by a group of arms control experts in Washington. Its authors included Johnathan Dean, former head of the U.S. negotiating team at the conventional force reduction talks and retired Vice Admiral John Lee, a former high-ranking NATO official.

"The widely accepted notion that the Warsaw Pact enjoys overwhelming superiority in Europe is wrong," the study concluded.

In Ottawa, the Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament is about to launch an investigation of its own. "Getting at this question requires Canadian planners to go beyond the orthodoxies that come out of NATO," said Barrett. "We should be doing our own studies to assess the level of our conventional deterrence.

"The military rule of thumb is that an attacker needs a three-to-one advantage," he explained. "But if we see ourselves as the defender, (NATO has always said that it would not strike first in conventional war) we may not be as badly off as we think."

Canada's role in the post-summit arms control debate, Barrett suggested, should be to project more confidence in NATO's strength and demand more critical analysis from its western allies.

Roche welcomed this proposal. "Conventional weapons have been used in 150 regional wars since 1945, killing more than 20 million people," he noted. "Gorbachev has said he is ready to move on conventional forces. He should be pushed."

This kind of thinking is by no means widespread in Canada. And it is being resisted vigorously by the Federal Defence Department, which looks on the post-summit era as the new golden age for Canada's conventional forces.

But ideas, once planted, are hard to kill.

There was a time—not long ago—when the idea that the leaders of the two superpowers might get together to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons seemed unthinkable. But somehow the dreamers prevailed.

The next unlikely idea is already germinating.

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Roundup on Moscow's View of U.S. INF Debate
11020844 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in
Chinese 1458 GMT 31 Jan 88

[“Roundup: Moscow Closely Watching Capitol Hill's Moves”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, 31 Jan (XINHUA)—Since the U.S. Senate began its hearings on 25 January on ratification of the intermediate-range missile treaty, Moscow's press has been closely watching the debate on Capitol Hill. Today, some major newspapers in Moscow published their commentaries on this subject.

Why has Moscow paid so much attention to this? In the words of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, because results of the struggle centering on ratification of the treaty will decide the future of Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation.

While all major newspapers have given wide coverage to the remarks by Reagan administration officials and Senate leaders of both parties actively advocating approval of the treaty, they held that it would be a big mistake to think that everything is okay just because these remarks were made. One of these newspapers

bluntly pointed out: “To put it mildly, the fate of the treaty is now in suspense. Although the U.S. Government and treaty supporters believe that they can strive to win the necessary votes for ratification of the treaty, enemies who are opposed to easing tensions and unwilling to cooperate in any form with the Soviet Union have not given up.” The newspaper is particularly worried that these enemies might undermine the treaty by making amendments or interpreting the provisions of the treaty in their own way.

Because examination of the treaty has just begun, observers here think that it is inappropriate to predict the results. However, they have noticed that in the Senate, the voices favoring approval of the treaty are a little stronger than those opposing it.

Another reason the Moscow press has paid special attention to Capitol Hill's moves is that the central issue of the debate there is not so much the treaty itself as how to further define the military system of the West. The fact that Soviet newspaper commentaries, including those published today, have expressed between the lines their great concern over the United States' attitude toward further disarmament and NATO's plan to replenish its arsenal has just revealed this.

Bessmertnykh on Reykjavik Summit, New Concepts

52001034 Moscow *VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA
INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSR* in Russian
No 5, 10 Oct 87 pp 10-11, 13-14

[Article by A.A. Bessmertnykh, deputy USSR minister of foreign relations: "The Reykjavik Meeting and the Diplomacy of New Thinking"; Gorbachev quote is *VESTNIK INOSTRANNYH DEL SSR* introduction. Passage in italics as published]

[Text]Reykjavik was truly a turning point in world history and demonstrated the possibility of improving world conditions. A different situation was created and after Reykjavik no one could act as if nothing had happened. And for us it was an event that confirmed the correctness of the course that we have chosen and the constructive nature of the new political thinking.

From the speech of M.S. Gorbachev in Murmansk on 1 October 1987.

A year ago, more precisely on 19 September 1986, in the course of a meeting with President Reagan in Washington, USSR Minister of Foreign Relations E.A. Shevardnadze gave him a personal message from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, which set the stage for the events that were destined to go down in the history of diplomacy as an occurrence of special importance. In his message, the Soviet leader, stating the fundamental approaches of the USSR to the vital problems of the present day, proposed to the president that they put off all their work for a day or two and hold a meeting in Iceland for the purpose of giving great momentum to negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet-American summit meeting had become a matter of urgent necessity: the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva were just marking time and in essence had reached a dead end. The arms race was continuing. It had become obvious that the matter had reached a point beyond which a new spiral in this race was inevitable with the predictable consequences, both political and military. Such a course of events had to be turned around completely.

After a few days of hesitation, the American President accepted the proposal of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. At the same moment on 30 September, E.A. Shevardnadze in New York and G. Shultz in Washington announced that the Soviet-American summit meeting would be held on the 11th and 12th of October 1986 in Reykjavik. This news immediately flew around the entire world—an important and extraordinary event was about to take place. With it were linked the hopes for a serious improvement in the international situation and for qualitative progress in the matter of achieving practical agreements on disarmament.

While observers in different countries competed with each other in the next 10 days in formulating forecasts on the possible outcome of the negotiations, intensive preparations for the upcoming talks continued in Moscow. M.S. Gorbachev would later say this about them: "...On the eve of the meeting, even before we received word of President Reagan's consent to the meeting, we in the Soviet leadership did much preparatory work. Participating in it, besides the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, were the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, other departments, representatives of science, military experts, and specialists in different branches of industry. The positions that we worked out for the meeting in Reykjavik were the result of extensive and repeated discussions with our friends, with the leadership of the countries of the socialist community. We sought to saturate the meeting with fundamental content and far-reaching proposals" (PRAVDA, 15 October 1986).

At the White House—but this, of course, is still a supposition based on the analysis of the subsequent behavior of the American side in Reykjavik—they reexamined their previous positions. By all appearances, they paid most of their attention to polishing their arguments in defense of these positions.

On Saturday and Sunday, when the negotiations took place, M.S. Gorbachev proposed to the President a package of measures that, if accepted, would mark the beginning of a new epoch in the life of humanity—a nuclear-free epoch. The Soviet proposals were formulated specifically, logically and understandably. They simplified and therefore facilitated the reaching of general agreements that could subsequently be transformed into juridically binding agreements within a rather short time.

In striving to ensure a decisive breakthrough, the Soviet Union sought mutually acceptable compromise solutions. Thus, for example, by introducing the proposal on medium-range missiles, we agreed to put aside the nuclear potentials of England and France and, in the area of strategic offensive arms, we took a step toward the American position so as to remove the concern of the United States about our heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The interests of our partner were also considered in the proposal on the problem of limiting and stopping nuclear tests. The Soviet Union came out in favor of the strictest verification of the observance of the proposed disarmament measures. We also proposed a strengthening of the ABM Treaty through the equal obligation of both sides over the course of 10 years not to utilize their right to withdraw from this treaty and to observe all of its requirements strictly, limiting research and testing to the scope of the laboratory.

The Hevdi residence, where the meeting took place, had probably never witnessed such intensive negotiations. They were held directly by leaders of the USSR and

United States with the participation of the foreign ministers, who held additional discussions during the breaks, striving to loosen the tight knots in individual problems so as to facilitate the course of the discussions between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. The protocol was put aside. Laborious diplomatic work was done. When agreements in principle were reached in a number of questions, two groups of experts (Footnote *) were entrusted with working out the details and these groups worked separately throughout the night of the 11th to the 12th of October.

Late in the evening after each round of negotiations, in the messroom of the motor vessel "Georg Ots," where the Soviet delegation was staying, M.S. Gorbachev held conferences with the official persons who traveled with the general secretary to participate in the meeting: E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.F. Dobrynin, A.S. Chernyyayev and S.F. Akhromeyev. He put forward new ideas and considerations, subjected the positions of the Americans to a rapid and precise analysis, and set up the tactics for the subsequent talks. In so doing, the general secretary asked for and listened attentively to the opinions of the other participants in the conference.

In the end, the sides were able to achieve the following agreements in principle.

It was agreed that in the first 5 years of a 10-year period, strategic offensive arms (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) will be reduced by half. The remaining strategic offensive arms would be eliminated in the second 5-year period. There was a general conversation on the possibility of eliminating all the nuclear arms of the sides within the course of a 10-year period.

Immediately after Reykjavik, the U.S. administration sought to depict the matter as if in the course of the meeting the American side had agreed to eliminate only ballistic missiles in the second 5-year period and not the entire triad of strategic offensive arms. Later one noted a further departure of the United States from the agreement that was reached—for example, they began to raise the time of the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms to 7 years; attempts were made to turn this reduction structurally into the maximum advantage of the United States and disadvantage of the USSR. The Soviet side, in turn, firmly favored and favors having the general agreement reached in this question in Reykjavik remain the basis of negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

A second element was the agreement on medium-range missiles according to the following formula: "zero" such missiles on both sides in Europe, freezing of the number of operational-tactical missiles there and the start of

negotiations on them, plus the reduction to 100 warheads on Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR with the United States having the right to the same number of warheads on such missiles in its own territory.

After Reykjavik, the American side sought to distort this agreement as well, trying to present the matter as though the USSR must agree to allow the United States to increase its number of operational-tactical missiles [up to the Soviet level] as well as to the "right" of the United States to deploy its own 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Alaska, that is, within the reach of the territory of the USSR.

As for nuclear tests, we proposed the start of full-scale negotiations for the achievement of an agreement on their complete cessation, in the course of which was also contemplated the discussion of interim solutions—the limitation of the power and number of nuclear explosions and the fate of the unratified agreements of 1974 and 1976 limiting the power of nuclear tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The sides were close to agreement on this question when the negotiations were interrupted because of the American position on space.

An important mutual understanding was originally established in this area to the effect that in the course of 10 years the sides will not utilize their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. But a serious and fundamental barrier arose here. The United States sought at all costs to get the USSR to agree to eliminate the ABM Treaty after a period of 10 years (And after Reykjavik they had already reduced this period to 7 years.), in the course of which the United States would be preparing to deploy a system of space arms.

The Soviet Union could not take this course. Agreement to such a formula would mean that, along with the mutual process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms, one side would be carrying out a program of unlimited tests of space arms and would receive in advance the consent of the other side to cross out the ABM Treaty and to deploy these arms. In this way, the "Star Wars" mania frustrated at the last moment the conclusion of agreements on an arms reduction of a unique scale. A historical opportunity to do this as early as the fall of 1986 had been lost.

Now, a year later, the meaning of what took place in Reykjavik and the lessons drawn from this event are especially obvious. Today no one can any longer deny that the Soviet-American meeting in the Icelandic capital was an important step in a complex and difficult dialogue aimed at the search for difficult solutions in the area of the specific limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. All of this is a tremendous experience and a tremendous gain not only for the further development of negotiations between the USSR and the United States but also for the world as a whole.

The course of the negotiations in Reykjavik showed, on the one hand, that the time for action has come, that the world needs real progress and disarmament and, on the other hand, that the United States and the American leadership were not then prepared to resolve fundamental questions in a big way.

The negotiations in Reykjavik also showed the entire world that the quintessence of the old approach demonstrated by the Americans was the "Star Wars" program, in which militaristic intentions and the unwillingness to remove the nuclear threat hanging over humanity are expressed in a concentrated way. In short, Reykjavik, having illuminated the difficulties on the way to a nuclear-free world, simultaneously revealed new prospects and marked the course of the movement in this direction.

To justify the apparent unwillingness of the United States to make radical decisions on nuclear disarmament, the propaganda in Washington will later introduce the version that President Reagan supposedly was "surprised" by the Soviet leader and was not prepared for such an intensive conversation. Everything was different in reality. In the mentioned letter to R. Reagan, M.S. Gorbachev specifically advised him of the questions that he proposed to discuss and of the direction in which, in the opinion of Moscow, a solution ought to be sought. In addition, the American President was accompanied in Reykjavik by practically all of the leading figures in the U.S. Government participating in the development of Washington's positions in the area of arms limitation. Reagan consulted with them constantly. The discussions were interrupted for this purpose.

It was apparent that Reagan, even if he himself wanted to make progress on the way to an agreement, was not free to do this, was not receiving any support. Also indicative here is the fact that literally within a few days after returning from Iceland the President of the United States was forced to renounce the consent that he had given and that we had settled on to eliminate everything, not just some individual strategic offensive arms, within 10 years in two stages.

Subsequent events will also reveal the effect of Reykjavik as a turning point in the matter of the conceptual substantiation and practical resolution of the basic problem of the present day—the elimination of nuclear arms. This historic event was a kind of culmination of the many years of efforts by the USSR, which has favored the resolution of the problem of nuclear superarmament, initially through reductions of the nuclear might of the USSR and United States.

The road to Reykjavik began with the meeting in Geneva, when the Soviet and American leaders declared that nuclear war must never be unleashed, that there can be no victors in it, and that neither of the sides will strive

for military superiority. The Soviet leadership worked out and implemented a series of important measures aimed at realizing these agreed-upon principles.

On 15 January 1986, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev presented the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear arms by the year 2000. In the summer of that same year, the Warsaw Pact states came out with a major initiative on a radical reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Soviet Union took a number of constructive steps that helped to advance the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and that breathed new life into the elaboration of an international convention on the banning of chemical weapons. The 27th CPSU Congress paid much attention to questions in the development of the innovative foreign-policy course of the USSR in the new and critical stage of international relations. This congress formulated the bases of a comprehensive system of security and stressed that the restructuring of international relations toward peace requires a new thinking and the renunciation of the dogmas of confrontation and the politics of force. And the repeated extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests was a specific manifestation of the willingness of the USSR to establish its own policies on the basis of the principles agreed on in Geneva.

The intellectual breakthrough in Iceland personified the realization—at least by the Soviet side—of the fact that the raising of the level of nuclear confrontation not only does not lead to a strengthening of military-strategic stability but at a certain level even of strictly balanced parity weakens this stability and makes it precarious.

To come to this key conclusion, it was necessary to take stock analytically of the established approaches and usual views of peace and security. In other words, it was necessary to apply a new thinking to this extremely important area as well. At least two fundamentally important conclusions flow from the sorting out of old dogmas and stereotypes.

First: the world in all of its diversity is one from the point of view of the highest interests for the survival of humanity. The task of preventing nuclear war is raised in its absolute importance over other interests—class, bloc and national interests.

Second: the security of any state will be more stable if that state stops striving to diminish the security of the opposing side. In other words, if one takes the Soviet-American corner, the USSR is not interested in the United States having a lower level of security, for this would give impetus to a risky arms race and would lead to dangerous instability.

Unfortunately, however, many people in the West perceive such decisive progress in the profound comprehension of the contemporary situation as heresy out of line

with the traditional rules of thought that became axiomatic not because of their internal logic but only because people servilely bowed down to them for so long. Clearly, the fact that upheavals in physics and military technology are outstripping those in political thinking also plays a role here.

If one synthesizes the practical effect of Reykjavik, then it consists in the fact that despite all the persisting differences in the positions of the USSR and United States, negotiations on strategic and offensive arms, medium-range missiles and the strengthening of the working of the ABM Treaty are being held on the basis of the agreements and understandings reached at the meeting of the Soviet and American leaders in the Icelandic capital. The USSR is not retreating from the parameters discussed there and is prepared to cover its part of the way to the realization of that which was talked about in Reykjavik.

In evaluating the meeting in the Icelandic capital, M.S. Gorbachev said, in particular: "I am convinced that we have not yet realized the importance of what took place. But we certainly will understand—if not today, then tomorrow—the full meaning of Reykjavik and we will give what is due to what was achieved and acquired as well as to the missed opportunities and losses."

"With all of the dramatics, both of the course of the negotiations as well as of their results, the meeting in Reykjavik, perhaps for the first time in many decades, advanced us a long way in the search for ways to nuclear disarmament" (PRAVDA, 23 October 1986).

In reviewing the distance covered after Reykjavik and the achievements in the strengthening of international security over the last year, you are once again convinced of the profound correctness of this assessment.

The negotiations held between E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz and President Reagan in Washington the 15th through the 17th of September are practical evidence of this. The agreement in principle reached there on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles—medium and shorter range, that is, in the range from 500 to 5,500 km—is a major step toward a nuclear-free world. Such a step would hardly have been possible without the Soviet-American summit meetings in 1985 and 1986 providing for a strong tendency in this direction.

The delegations of the USSR and United States are working intensively on the legal formulations of the future treaty, the text of which is supposed to be ready by the time of the next meeting of ministers the 22nd and 23rd of October. In the course of the Moscow meeting, they will also examine the possibility of working out in the near future a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of

strategic offensive arms under the conditions of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty. The sides agreed that this line will remain the focus of attention at the Geneva negotiations.

Considerable progress was also made in the question of the beginning of full-scale negotiations between the USSR and United States on the limitation and ultimately on the complete stopping of nuclear tests. Such negotiations are supposed to begin by 1 December 1987.

Thus, the first real prospects in history for the achievement of specific reductions of nuclear arms are a logical step in the process that received a strong impetus in the Icelandic capital in the fall of last year. In characterizing the fundamental agreement on medium and shorter-range missiles, E.A. Shevardnadze especially emphasized: "I believe that the agreements reached reflect precisely the spirit of Geneva and Reykjavik."

The tremendous potential of Reykjavik, which began to be realized in the agreements already reached and in those to come, is now seen even more clearly.

Footnote

* Group on questions in arms limitation: the Soviet part: S.F. Akhromeyev (leader), G.A. Arbatov, Ye. P. Velikhov, V.P. Karpov, R.Z. Sagdeyev, V.M. Falin; the American part: P. Nitze (leader), E. Rauni, R. Pearl, K. Edelman, M. Kampelman, R. Linhardt.

Group on regional, bilateral and humanitarian questions: the Soviet part: A.A. Bessmertnykh (leader), Ye.P. Primakov, Yu.V. Dubinin, N.V. Shishlin, V.A. Mikolchak; the American part: R. Ridgeway (leader), G. Matlock, A. Hartman, T. Simons, M. Perris.

9746

British MP David Owen Interviewed on INF 18120044 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 49, Dec 87 pp 7-9

[Interview with Dr David Owen, M.P. by Galina Sidorova: "When Will Britain Join In?" Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Switching on the TV in London these days one found one and the same topic practically at any time of the day: the meeting of the Soviet and British leaders in Moscow and the Gorbachev visit to London several years ago. That recent history was being recalled in connection with the coming Washington summit. And then a few days ago "hot news" flashed on TV screens: on his way to Washington the Soviet leader would stop over in Britain and have talks with the Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher. In diplomatic parlance this is known as a flying visit. Local colleagues immediately started guessing what would be discussed during the three-hour talks, and who is more interested in them. In my opinion, guessing who stands to gain or lose is a senseless affair.

The interest is mutual. On the Soviet side it reflects recognition of the role Britain could play in strengthening European and world security. On the British side, the wish to participate in a process ushering in a new stage in East-West relations and in the history of mankind in general. London's position contains an internal contradiction: it wants to influence events and be part of them, but so far it is not contemplating joining in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is that which is now arousing such stormy discussions in British political circles. There are arguments about Britain's own nuclear deterrent force, the minimal level required for defence, the Labour Party's declared policy that it favours unilateral nuclear disarmament, which some analysts believe brought them defeat at the election. Support for unilateral British nuclear disarmament was reaffirmed at the recent annual conference of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

The situation today has no single interpretation. To understand it one has to know all viewpoints. What is at stake is the country's prestige, but the thing is that different quarters interpret it differently, often in directly opposite ways. The magazine will in one of its future issues write in greater detail about these debates that could affect the further course of events in Britain and her foreign policy. Today we tell you about an interview which we had together with the Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent Yuri Sagaidak on the eve of the flying visit and the talks in Washington. The interview was with Dr David Owen, M.P.—once Britain's youngest ever Foreign Secretary in the Labour government, then Social Democratic leader and to day one of Britain's most able politicians. We were looking forward to the interview also because Dr Owen's views could be described as middle-of-the-road, a stand which many prominent politicians are now moving towards.

What role could Britain play in strengthening European security and in the disarmament process in which the Soviet Union and the United States are now actively involved?

Well, I think that we are getting very close to the time when bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on disarmament will be insufficient. The INF agreement is important. But an even more important agreement will be a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms. And I think progress on this will be made in Washington. Once that is achieved I think you will find it will have an impact on other countries. I think it is unreasonable to believe that you will be able to go on making cuts in Soviet and U.S. arsenals without some understanding that it must involve Britain, France and China. Britain must be ready to participate in those discussions and I think we should be at the table, not having them discussed through third parties.

Why do you think some West European leaders are so worried by a future INF agreement?

Because they've always seen part of Soviet diplomatic and military policy to be to uncouple the United States from the defence of Europe. And the problem we have had until recently is that the world superpowers had the dominance in world policy. This is now drawing to a natural end. Bipolarity has changed to multipolarity. I think that you both are determining the course of events less than, say, 15 years ago. One of the reasons that you're economically weaker is that you have taken on the global swell which goes beyond your interests and you've overstretched your resources. Domestic economic problems in the Soviet Union, the huge budget deficit in the United States caused by excessive military expenditure—largely for maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe—pushes you towards one another and therefore to disarmament. Western Europe is reluctant to pay higher defence bills. So any reduction whether of U.S. conventional troop forces or nuclear missiles causes a shadow of apprehension because we are not self-confident that we will fill the gap. This adds to the anxiety. There is an inherent geographical factor. The United States is tied to us by common values, ideals and history, but it is separated by 3,000 nautical miles. With you—everything is the other way round. Your nuclear arsenals are part of the continent of Europe which we share. And that's behind the Western logic—the wish to have Americans on the ground in Western Europe. It corrects the geographical asymmetry. Now you for obvious reasons want to reduce or remove it.

The economic potential of Europe is now higher than that of the Soviet Union and the United States. We are by any normal standards quite able to grapple without the same level of United States support as in the past. So for that reason there are some of us in this country and pretty soon everybody in France who believe that while you retain your nuclear arsenal, we should too. That's my position.

And what nuclear potential do you think Britain needs?

Before answering that question, one observation. The reappraisal now taking place in the policy of the leading nuclear powers. For years the American and your nuclear arsenals grew and grew, and the leaders matched every step of each other. Now, I believe, even many generals have begun to realize the folly of this. The new Soviet leadership has come to the problem with a fresh eye. It appears now that President Reagan, despite his previous position, has also taken a new look at the situation. You agreed that you are not going to get damaged by a 50 per cent reduction. In other words, we are beginning to get into the most fascinating area of nuclear strategy, which is the minimum deterrent. And we are moving to keeping a nuclear deterrent, which is second strike, as it should be.

That doesn't mean we have to have equality of weapons with you. The interesting thing is that China has been in advance of us all—it understood a minimal nuclear deterrent before us all. They have not got around to this

matching business. Britain and France will have to be involved in any future talks. Otherwise, one fine day we could find ourselves with 20 Trident submarines instead of the several we have now. Multilateral negotiations is in the Soviet interests as well, because we, like you, don't like "star wars." We, like you, fear that it will step up expenses, unrestrained new technologies. You'll find in Britain and France a passionate commitment to the ABM Treaty. So on the whole, multilateral arms negotiations seems to me a very sensible objective of Soviet foreign policy.

And of British?

Well, it's not. This is the most extraordinary thing. I would certainly make it my policy. But Mrs. Thatcher is very reluctant, because she feels that the British potential will be out. And so will the French. I don't understand their position, and so I'm not the best person to explain it. The paradox is that the government is apprehensive about multilateral discussions and they also fear that the Americans will do a deal over and above our heads, as essentially they did at Reykjavik—their commitment to remove all strategic arms, including ballistic missiles. It was done without any discussion with us. Although in principle I agree with this.

I think that strategic weaponry are potentially first-strike weapon systems. I mean that they can go up in space. I feel personally that you can have minimum deterrence without them. If I were Britain's prime minister today I would go for non-ballistic missiles, for cruise missiles. They have their verification problems. But the basic thing is that they are in essence second-strike systems. You and the Americans have already gone down the route for the complete removal of such missile systems. So far the American administration is not hopeful about getting approval for such a global action—neither from the military nor Congress. So for some time yet we'll go on with a mixed arsenal of ballistic and non-ballistic systems.

What about the so-called "British independent deterrence potential?" Is it really independent?

No, it is not completely, although we can activate it ourselves if the situation calls for it. It is not easy to define the rationale behind the concept of the British independent deterrent, just as behind the concept of deterrence in general. British military-political concepts today tend to make us a Europe-oriented country more than ever before. It seems most unlikely that Britain could ever think of using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in isolation from France.

Don't you have to consult Washington?

We don't. The only reason we want to have an independent nuclear deterrent is because we know that no U.S. President would even contemplate running the risk of

losing Detroit for the sake of, say Dusseldorf. We know what American isolationism is. On the other hand, possession of a system that can be used at our discretion ties the United States to us.

Could progress on the reduction of nuclear arsenals block the Trident programme?

Theoretically it could, yes. It would be a breach of faith between Britain and the United States. We learnt what that could mean several decades ago when the Americans shut their laboratories to our scientists. My wife is an American. I like Americans, but I am always careful in dealing with them. Because it could happen again. That's why I'm for Anglo-French cooperation. If Mrs. Thatcher's government had not tied itself to the Trident agreement, but cooperated, say with the French, we would not have been tied to the American system for the next 20-30 years. We are going to spend so much money on the Trident that in 1991 you couldn't possibly cancel it unless you didn't want your own deterrent.

But what concrete steps towards disarmament could Britain make in the nearest future?

I think we should go for multilateral negotiations. Let's say, we don't. It would be reasonable if America and the Soviet Union cut their strategic arsenals by 50 per cent that we should keep our nuclear deterrent at its present level at 4 Trident submarines provided the SDI is not implemented. Because if you are a country with a modest number of warheads the chance of them getting through a space defence shield is infinitely smaller than for a country with a bigger potential. Maybe we can move to a completely non-nuclear world. My own view is that if we are going to do it we should move next to battlefield weapons. In the Palme Commission I was the architect of the idea of a nuclear-free corridor in Europe between the Warsaw pact and NATO. I still believe that to be an important confidence-building measure.

Do you see a time when your country could begin to reduce its own nuclear arsenal?

Of course I think that there is a certain reduction we can make. Personally I wouldn't mind living with one Trident submarine under some circumstances, if you were going to cut another 50 per cent of your arsenals right on top of the first. Rightly we are counting warheads. We should also proceed from the number of warheads needed for a minimum deterring potential. Another way to limit the arms race is to go for a comprehensive test ban of which I am a strong advocate.

Soviet-American talks begin in Washington shortly. On his way to the United States the Soviet leader will stop over in Britain. If you were Prime Minister what would you have suggested in the field of Soviet-British relations?

I would seek close realistic relations with you and I would talk on everything. I'd encourage a lot more trade. Our trade is not really enough. So our trade needs more substance—money. We should tie ourselves through trade. In terms of defence I think we should have realistic relations. The processes taking place in the Soviet Union are conducive to establishing a certain level of trust. I'm now reading Mr. Gorbachev's book. He is a very interesting man. But the West has no illusions that he's a liberal in our sense of the word. As far as I can judge from what I've read he's a Leninist. But there is logic in the way he's moving. He can be successful and retain his Communist beliefs. Western democracies aren't perfect. We can live together and tolerate our differences and continue a mutually advantageous dialogue.

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Correspondent Assesses U.S. Reaction to Summit
18120043 Moscow *NEW TIMES* in English
No 51, Dec 87 pp 3-8

[Article by *NEW TIMES* special correspondent Alexander Pumpyansky: "America Likes Glasnost"]

[Text] Thousands of words were uttered, and commented upon in millions more on those historic days in Washington. Of this number I'd like to single out just twelve, which comprise a single simple sentence and can serve as an epigraph to and a conclusion to be drawn from the summit:

Mankind is beginning to realize that it has had enough of wars." (From Mikhail Gorbachev' speech at the U.S. Department of State).

The summit which gave rise to a wealth of speculation, doubts and disputes and on which many hopes and expectations were pinned, is over. Politicians and journalists (ourselves included) are bound to look back now and again on its landmarks as they assess current political realities, ascertaining the progress made so far and the route of further advance. The witness of that event are still full of first-hand impressions. Details of what they have seen and heard clash, pile up, and combine into arbitrary patterns pop-art style in which things important and not-so-important, high politics and commonplaces get along on an equal footing.

Washington patchwork

A Marine orchestra attached to the White House rehearsed the Soviet National Anthem....GIs waved red pennants....A newspaper commentator quipped: "Few in the country were immune to the drama of TV pictures of the two leaders in profile with the real Soviet flag whipping in the wind behind them."

During divine service in Washington Cathedral the continuous public prayer for the success of the summit was offered up by American preachers of various Christian denominations and by Russian orthodox priests....

At the entrance to the national Press Club, mummers masked as the two leaders shoved tabloids headlined "LaRouche for President!" at passersby. "I shall tear the INF off!" the new-fangled "presidential candidate" threatened. It was LaRouche and his cronies from the extremist party who had sued *New Times* in Paris.

Tight security measures were taken. Concrete barriers were put up in front of the Soviet embassy, and street traffic was restricted. Before every trip the minibus that plied between the Hotel Vista (where Soviet newsmen were billeted) and the press centre was inspected by police using dogs trained to sniff out dynamite.

In the plush Hotel Mariotte, a press centre and a cafe called *Glasnost* were set up overnight. A newspaper headline screamed: "Glasnost is Danger!" A sportswear store offered T-shirts inscribed "Glasnost!" in Russian or English characters for the customers to choose from. Such T-shirts cost 50 per cent more than those bearing other inscriptions: *glasnost* is at a premium.

A black plywood horse about four metres tall, rigged up in a hurry, had a warning splashed on its flank: "The INF is a Trojan Horse!"

All the media reported an unfortunate incident involving the children's organization Peace Bird which had sent roses to the two leaders. In the Soviet embassy the kids met with a warm reception, but the the White House slammed its door in their faces, and relegated their floral tribute to the garbage can. What the incident went to show was not so much that the White House men are wicked, as that policy-making should not be left to janitors. Moreover, it furnished fresh evidence of how harmful bureaucracy can be at any, even the highest, level.

Margarita Papandreou, the first lady of Greece, made an animated speech on behalf of the international organization Women for a Meaningful Summit....The organization Women for SDI staged a mini-demonstration in Lafayette Park....On the days of the summit, the park, a traditional meeting place of all those wishing to speak up and draw attention to themselves, was babel of voices either denouncing the summit with Afghan, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalist accents, or welcoming it—the "peaceniks" of the Freeze, SANE and other anti-war organizations, Elbe linkup veterans and Vietnam war veterans were all for the summit.

I shall take the liberty of digressing a little from my subject at this point. Stretching my legs one day, I chanced upon the monument to the Americans who had lost their lives in the Vietnam war. It was an utterly realistic sculpture of three privates frozen in crouched

anticipation of the dangers threatening them from all sides. The names of all those who had perished in Vietnam—almost 50,000 of them—were cut on a black marble stele alongside a ditch.

I saw a young woman pressing a sheet of paper against the marble and vigorously rubbing her hand against it. When she finally stopped and held the sheet up for inspection, it bore the imprint of a name, probably dear to her—the last trace of a vanished life....

In Lafayette Park I had a talk with a tall leisurely man of about 40, wearing khakis and a helmet—and suddenly realized that this scene was not entirely irrelevant to the subject of my story. Asked why he was there, he replied: "I had friends who died in Vietnam. I don't want anyone to die the way they did...."

Someone called himself "Wake Up, Mr America" had hired a plane in order to take his message as high as the skies.

Another sensational report: an American plane loaded with supplies for the contras who shot down over Nicaragua. Even the Summit did not go without an American plane violating someone's airspace!

The sight of Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, entering the Pentagon for talks with U.S. Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci and Admiral William Crow, chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, takes some getting used to, I must say.

In the press centre, briefings for 7,000 newsmen were held jointly by Martin Fitzwater, a White House spokesman, and Gennady Gerasimov of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry—an unforgettable pair who made up in humour for what we lacked in information; and humour is a commodity you can't ever have enough of....

Van Cliburn staged a comeback and played "Evenings in the Moscow Countryside" in the White House. Television builds bridges between continents, so dragging someone back from oblivion is no problem to it. A TV network interviewed the hero of the White House concert, whom the narrator showered with questions like what he felt at the moment when it occurred to him to break into song and to invite the audience to sing along; why he hadn't been heard of over the past few years; and what his plans were. The moved pianist answered all questions at length. His face—the face of a man who had been through a lot—spoke louder than words. Now fifty, he has experienced triumph and despair, but it so happened that all the "ups" in the roller coaster of his life were connected with Moscow, Tchaikovsky, Russia. And now that he seemed to have resigned himself to being past his prime, he was suddenly in the limelight again—and on the crest of a tidalwave of popularity stirred up by a Russian melody. Yes, he would give

public recitals again, he said happily, he had just been offered two flattering engagements, one of them by the National Symphony Orchestra from Washington.

Van Cliburn's is a unique case. But why is it unique, I wondered later. Why are the links between our two countries so undeservingly weak? Why does military and ideological confrontation suppress business, cultural and human relationships? Who has gained from this? Neither of the two nations has—rather the contrary.

We're different. So what?

In his speech at the INF treaty signing ceremony, Mikhail Gorbachev quoted Emerson as saying: "The best reward for a job well done is having it done." Ronald Reagan cited a quotation from Tolstoi. A magnificent exchange. In the lobbies, journalists betted on how many Russian sayings and catch phrases the President would use. With his penchant for proverbial wisdom, Ronald Reagan surpassed all expectations. But we didn't mind at all, for that was the kind of "information leak" that benefits all.

What mattered to us most of all were the subjects of discussions, the negotiators' tones of voice, the points on which, they agreed—or disagreed. In spite of all, we wanted a duet, not a duel. Life experience warns us to be conservative in our estimates, but we still have a strong impression that what we heard in Washington carried a world of meaning.

The outcome of the meeting depended on what would be brought to the fore—our differences, or what we have in common.

Far from being passed over in silence, the differences were discussed at considerable length, sometimes sharply. What political conclusions did the two leaders draw?

Ronald Reagan: This unpleasant reality is no cause for pessimism, we must regard it as a challenge to change over from confrontation to cooperation.

Mikhail Gorbachev: In modern politics, wisdom consists in not using these differences as a pretext for confrontation, enmity and the arms race.

Ronald Reagan was of the opinion that man's fundamental convictions as regards the relationships between citizens and the state, between man and god, constitute the essence of rivalry between our two countries. He said he was speaking about responsibility which required that our differences be settled peacefully.

Mikhail Gorbachev: Without belittling the great political and ideological distances which separate us, we intend to seek and find pathways for rapprochement in the areas of vital importance for both of us and for the whole of mankind.

Note the similarity of these statements in tone and content. What's behind it? Certainly not the desire to impress one another. There were objective reasons, to be sure. A reflection of commonly reality—this is what we saw this time in the speeches by the two statesmen different to the point of being poles apart. After all, we are all in the same boat. Modern politics is, to a greater extent than ever, the art of discerning the dangers, problems and needs of real life and the needs of the people of all nations, that is, not only of any particular one, and of all mankind.

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There is no denying the fact that deep-going differences can furnish a "justification" for hostility and a pretext for perpetuating confrontation. The beaten track leads to hopeless conclusions. The realities of the nuclear age demand something entirely different: that we should not entrench ourselves in our differences, prevent them from developing into armed conflicts, from causing us to lose our head. These differences should be regarded as a constructive challenge, as an invitation to cooperation; new and unexpected prerequisites for cooperation should be sought in them.

Frankly, I did not expect President Reagan to prove capable of drawing such conclusions. His entire record offered no hope of that. I proved mistaken, and that was good. It is precisely for his new realism that the President is coming under fire from his own "comrades-in-arms."

President accused of treason

Senator Jesse Helms described the INF treaty as a bag of worms. Howie Phillips, another Conservative militant, went even further than that: he called the President "a useful idiot from the Kremlin's standpoint."

This kind of language alone gives away the fanatics, whose tiny one-track minds can be likened to a nuclear-pumped laser which generates a tremendous amount of energy confined to a pencil beam. Why are they so resentful? The way they see it, Ronald Reagan has betrayed the very ideal Christian fundamentalists turned their backs on Reagan because he had "joined hands with an anti-God regime."

Now Ronald Reagan is being vindictively reminded of the following statement he once made: "Most people agree that the ideological struggle with Russia is the No.

1 problem in the world...and yet many men in high places in government and many who mould public opinion in the press and on the airwaves subscribe to the theory that we are at peace... The inescapable truth is that we are at war, and we are losing that war simply because we don't or won't realize we are in it!"

True, these words were uttered way back in 1961. But, first of all, Reagan has repeatedly spoken in the same vein since them. And second, "true conservatives" plume themselves on their unadulterated ideological purity: although the world has changed over the past twenty-five years, their views haven't. They proceed from dogma, not from reality. Any attempt to adjust the dogma to reality is regarded by them as treason.

Their sermons boil down to the following: communism is a system of total repression, of subordinating the individual to the state. The U.S.S.R. is a totalitarian state which has set itself the objective of conquering the world. There can be no peaceful coexistence between it and the liberal West. This being so, why all the handshakes and treaties? The East responds only to force. Any form of arms control is a hoax. Such is the catechism of the eternally Right.

Flora Lewis, the keenly observant New York Times analyst, aptly described this crowd as "knee-jerk" conservatives (implying the reflex contraction of the knee muscles induced by a tap of a neurologist's mallet.)

To quote Pete du Pont, a Republican presidential nominee: "We defend freedom in this country, we don't just strive for peace." Opposing peace to freedom is typical. (Remember Haig's famous phrase "There are things more important than peace"?) By this logic, any move toward peace amounts to the betrayal of freedom, to criminal softness vis-a-vis communism, to "selling out to communism."

It would be dangerous to underestimate the influence of the political fundamentalists. Reagan, I fear, will have to try and build bridges between himself and his furious colleagues and old confidants. In an election year any contender for the presidency will have to take their sentiments into account, but it will be at the expense of realism. That, however, is not all. American society in its entirety is infected to one degree or other with the virus of anti-communist prejudice.

Material for the enemy image

How is it done? Very simple. The enemy image is created to order, simply by playing on the public's lack of knowledge.

Revolutionaries, it is alleged, have no conscience or moral sense. They are prepared to do anything to destroy social institutions. To back this allegation up, there are quotes from Nechayev—conservative journalists take pleasure in referring to him by his Christian name and

patronymic. The quotations are indeed shocking. But it is never mentioned that the Social Democrats rejected Nechayev back in the 19th century. Right-wingers, who don't think much of Nechayev, turn to the words and deeds of Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot.... If there is no suitable quotation they invent fantastical ones from Lenin—we heard piles upon piles of them from senior Western figures, and always cited without chapter and verse.

And how they played with Khruschev's phrase "We shall bury you...." (Incidentally, at his very first news conference during his visit to America in 1959, he was asked what he had meant by it. And he replied seriously to comments about his unsuitable jest: "My statement was deliberately distorted. It wasn't a question of who would bury whom, but of changes in the social system.... What I had in mind was that in the context of history capitalism would be buried and replaced by communism." That did not help. The phrase is still quoted to prove the blood-thirsty intentions of the terrible Bolsheviks.)

And how many times at news conferences in Washington were our representatives nonplussed by one particular question, not because it seemed elementary: "Don't Communists in their speeches speak of the coming victory of communism on a world scale?" That well-known rhetorical phrase expressing the faith of Communists in the ultimate triumph of their ideals regarding a socio-economic system serves as irrefutable proof of nothing less than Soviet plans for world domination! That is the kind of substitution made. And then, on the basis of simple arithmetic—how many times a given Soviet leader used that phrase a conclusion is drawn about the stage at which the communist conspiracy and preparations for war now stand. It would be easy to dismiss that kind of logic as ridiculous. But one should not forget that what every schoolchild in this country knows is not self-evident to people in America—and they can all be said to live in an anti-communist province.

Other events of the recent past were also used to consolidate anti-Soviet fortifications. On the eve of the Washington summit, each of the major TV networks recapitulated the history of past meetings for its audiences. And, perhaps unintentionally, they all produced the same version: 1955 - the Geneva meeting of Eisenhower-Bulganin-Eden-Faure; 1956 - the "events in Hungary" kill the Geneva spirit; 1967 - the Johnson-Kosygin meeting in Glassboro; 1968 - "events in Czechoslovakia" kill the Glassboro spirit; 1979 - the Carter-Brezhnev meeting in Vienna; that same year - Afghanistan. Put that way, only one conclusion can be drawn: that the U.S.S.R. is a dark aggressive force, which only needs summits to camouflage its true intentions.

A crude recapitulation, with cause and effect unconnected, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate this system of proving anti-communist tenets and understanding the harm they do.

We too perhaps should stop and consider more seriously how ideology and politics are combined, the foreign policy effect of postulates that are not based on concrete political analysis. And, of course, we have to take into account how our words and deeds will be understood by our neighbours, friends and adversaries. Since so many different people live in one world, it is essential to listen more closely to the world's heartbeat and more carefully check our revelations against universal human values. Without trust no comprehensive security system can be built, nor can we advance to a nuclear-free world.

The main secret

In the meantime, the West is shouting, with and without cause, that the Soviet Union is not to be trusted! That it is useless and even dangerous to reach any agreements with a country that cannot be trusted. That is the logic. The significance of the latest Washington summit does not only lie in the fact that a treaty, in many respects a model one, was signed in Washington, for the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, but above all in the fact that the summit destroyed a number of medium- and shorter-range anti-Soviet prejudices. Not for nothing did this alarm American political fundamentalists.

The ultra group called the summit Pearl Harbor-87. They played on the actual dates (the Soviet leader arrived in America on December 7, and December 7, 1941, was the black night for the American Fleet.) But in playing on the coincidence of dates they revealed what they would have preferred to keep hidden—their fear of the very idea of any American-Soviet rapprochement and a terrible inferiority complex. The summit was ranked with America's greatest defeats even before it had begun.

According to the polls, Gorbachev collected almost as many points from the Americans as their own President. And that was when I heard Patrick Buchanan, a former Reagan speech-writer, urging his compatriots in his familiar forceful style on TV to find out who is responsible. One of the presidential candidates, the influential Senator Robert Dole, insisted on an end to the glasnost fever. A conservative newspaper observer declared that there should be "no more summits at home. Summits by all means, but in neutral places, preferably far away and with nasty climates." While his more energetic colleagues called for a mobilization against Gorbachev.

What were they so scared of?

The first nuclear disarmament treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. And the fact that it won't be the last. What scared them even more was the possibility of the "star wars" programme petering out.

But most of all they were scared by—dare I say it?—the fact that a Communist looked human. Because that, after all, was the top strategic secret that had been kept from

the American public—that Communists are also people, and that the Soviet Union is a normal society. Thanks to TV, the Soviet leader in just three days entered American homes, and seems to have been accepted by them. And so the secret became public knowledge.

Another conclusion drawn from American sources. They feared the very thing Americans seemed to like most about the new Soviet policy of glasnost: the three "Rs"—reason, realism and reform.

Unwittingly, the best answer to the question of the day was given by a very conservative journalist who wrote that Gorbachev had a disarming smile.

But in a world where so many weapons have been accumulated, and where hostility and fear have reached critical levels, a disarming smile is, you will agree, exactly what is needed.

Washington-Moscow

/12223

Indian VP Praises Gorbachev, USSR-U.S. Peace Efforts

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No 51, Dec 87 p 7

[Vice-President Shanker Dayal Sharma interviewed by New Times special correspondent in Delhi, Leonid Zhegalov: "Peace Today Means Life Tomorrow"]

[Text] N.T. Mr Vice-President, you are a leading Indian statesman of international standing, extremely active in the cause of peace and disarmament. From this standpoint, how do you assess the political significance of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles?

Sharma. General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan have taken a very important step towards creating a world free of nuclear weapons and, in the final count, achieving complete and universal disarmament. The world needs such a step as never before. If I may permit myself an excursus into the past, India, on achieving political independence from the outset favoured disarmament. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Indian national liberation movement, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, exhorted us to spare no effort in the struggle for the twin goals of peace and freedom. And in her turn Indira Gandhi carried out their behest. Her dictum—unless there is peace today there will not be life tomorrow—is well known. In this context, General Secretary Gorbachev has put forward truly courageous initiatives. Realism has also triumphed in the corridors of power in Washington. It therefore follows from our national stand on the issue of peace and disarmament that we in India greet the Soviet-American agreement with great satisfaction.

N.T. India was the birthplace of the famous Delhi Declaration on principles for a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world. How does the Soviet-American agreement accord with the spirit of the document?

Sharma. The Delhi Declaration answers to the aspirations of the peoples of the world, irrespective of their political convictions, religious faiths or the colour of their skins. The treaty signed in Washington likewise answers to these aspirations. In the eyes of the people of the planet, it therefore reflects the spirit of the Delhi Declaration, and contributes significantly towards its implementation. It is now to be hoped that we can look forward to new initiatives from the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the issue of disarmament. The peoples of the world, for whom the Delhi Declaration has become an imperative of international life, are hoping for rapid progress in limiting strategic arms.

N.T. India became a party to the Delhi Six, making a useful contribution in the field of disarmament. From this standpoint, how does she assess the Soviet-American Treaty?

Sharma. The initiatives of the Delhi Six were the result of concern for the fate of peace on the part of six countries on four continents. That is why the public in these countries is expressing complete support for the results of the Washington talks. It is well known that the Delhi Six have also put forward concrete proposals in the field of arms reduction control. For this reason the ability of the two sides to reach a practical agreement in this sphere is a source of special satisfaction to us.

N.T. Mr Vice-President, you are chairman of the international jury of the Indira Gandhi prize for peace, disarmament, and development. The prize was recently awarded to Mikhail Gorbachev. What do you think about it?

Sharma. The Indira Gandhi prizes are awarded to prominent state and public figures who have made a notable contribution to the struggle for peace and disarmament, racial rights, a new international economic order, and to the enrichment of the human spirit. Mr Gorbachev has made creative and innovative efforts to achieve these goals. We are very pleased that our decision has coincided with the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, whose ideals, deriving as they do from Lenin's Decree on Peace, the Soviet leader is trying to put into force in the international arena. I'll let you into a secret. In India the hope is being expressed that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU will come here in person to collect the award.

/12223

Western Europe Criticized for INF Stance

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No 51, Dec 87 pp 8-11

[Article by Alexander Lebedev: "The Spectre of Neutrality or Why Western Europe is Jittery"]

[Text] Whenever the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. succeed in reaching substantive agreement in the sphere of disarmament or there are signs of movement towards further understanding, Western Europe begins to get the jitters. This reaction, which Ian Davidson of the Financial Times described as nervous and infantile, was fully manifest in connection with the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Washington.

As a matter of fact, this sort of thing has happened before—in the early 1970s, for instance, when the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. signed the highly important SALT 1 and ABM treaties. And after Reykjavik, Western Europe was positively panic-stricken.

In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger noted this specific syndrome, a mixture of persecution mania and the inferiority complex, that afflicts the West European allies. In periods of aggravation, the former Secretary of State complained, they were wary lest Washington draw them into some sort of irresponsible venture, and with detente coming on, were scared of a Soviet-U.S. "condominium."

What is the explanation? Are the West Europeans alarmed by any easing of tension in the relations between the two powers? Does this in some way threaten the interest of Western Europe?

European fears

The prospect of Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium-and shorter-range missiles caused a flurry in some political circles of Western Europe at first. True, later on the West European members of NATO, at all the meetings of the bloc in November and December, formally supported the treaty. Moreover, they urged the American legislators, albeit reluctantly, not to drag out ratification. Indeed, they could hardly have taken any other stand considering that NATO members had at one time declared in favour of the "double zero." Torpedoing the treaty (say, through non-ratification) would therefore have had serious political consequences for them.

The INF treaty has revealed the different approaches to the matter.

In Paris, for instance, the right raised a hysterical howl: the Soviet Union is disarming Western Europe! Defence Minister Andre Giraud went so far as to compare the treaty with the Munich pact of 1938 which opened the way to Nazi aggression.

The French minister can only be commended for not ignoring history. Regrettably, he draws the wrong kind of lesson from past experience.

Fortunately, few share this view. On the whole the West European governments support both the agreement reached and further Soviet-American steps towards

reducing nuclear armaments. But only in principle and within definite limits. There is more or less unanimity as regards the 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. But beyond that, as Margaret Thatcher, for instance, holds, there is no need to hurry. The French leadership takes the same view.

London and Paris reason thus: if reductions were to be continued beyond the 50 percent cut, it would naturally become increasingly difficult for them to evade participation in the process. Today Britain and France can still say that their turn has not come yet, inasmuch as the Soviet (and the American) nuclear potentials are far greater than theirs. But if in the 1990s the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. (after the 50 per cent reductions) retain about 6,000 nuclear warheads each, the ratio will radically change. For at the present rate of modernization of their nuclear forces Britain and France would by the year 2000 have together at least two thousand nuclear warheads. Possibly even more, depending on the modification of the American Trident 2 system with which the British submarines and the French M-4 and M-5, which are replacing the M-20, are being equipped.

It may be objected that the British and French nuclear forces are independent of the United States. However, the degree of the independence of the British nuclear forces evokes ironic smiles both in Washington and in London (considering Britain's total dependence on the U.S. in the means of delivery, and not only in that). For Moscow, one thing is clear: these weapons, like the French, are targeted on Soviet territory.

Bent on excluding their own nuclear forces from any limitations, London and Paris display not the slightest interest in the speedy elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

True, Bonn takes a stand of its own on this question, and quite understandably since in the event of a conflict most of these warheads would explode on German soil.

What arguments are most frequently advanced against the "third zero" for retaining battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe? As a rule, the following.

Argument 1: Without nuclear forces Western Europe would be defenceless in face of the "overwhelming preponderance" of the Warsaw Treaty states in conventional weaponry and armed forces, and also in stocks of chemical weapons.

Argument 2: the withdrawal of all American nuclear warheads from Europe would mean driving a breach between the West European defences and the United States. Incidentally, it transpires that the American Pershing 2s and cruise missiles were deployed not in reply to the Soviet SS-20s (as was previously maintained), but in order to ensure linkage between the

American and West European forces. How did the Europeans manage to hold out before without that linkage, prior to 1983, one wonders?

There is another, non-military, argument: without the nuclear umbrella Western Europe might become completely dependent, politically and economically, on the Soviet Union. Moreover, of late this danger has increased, they say, as a result of the "Gorbachev effect," perestroika and democratization in the U.S.S.R.

Defenceless Western Europe?

As regards the danger of its defences being severed from the United States, both President Reagan and other American officials have given the assurance that nothing of the kind will happen. Why not believe them? Moreover that assurance is guaranteed by the fact that apart from the preservation in the foreseeable future of American tactical nuclear weapons on European soil (about 4,500 units) there still are more than 300,000 American servicemen stationed here. Although former F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for instance, confidently says that nothing terrible would happen if the American forces left the continent.

Now about the "overwhelming" Warsaw Treaty preponderance in conventional armed forces and armaments against which Western Europe can supposedly defend itself only with nuclear weapons.

The abundance of often contradictory evaluations of the ratio between the forces of the two blocs has confused many an experienced commentator. Neal Ascherson of the British Observer recently wrote of his puzzlement on this score. In June 1986, he writes, the Times reported that NATO had 5 million men under arms and the Warsaw Treaty countries, 6.4 million. Two days later the Daily Telegraph spoke of 2.29 million servicemen on the NATO side and 2.8 million on the Warsaw Treaty side. In March this year the Independent put the figures at 5 million and 6.2 million respectively. As regards tanks, the Independent mentioned the figure 20,300 on the Western side and 46,000 on the side of the East. And the Daily Telegraph on the very same day maintained that NATO had 9,000 tanks and the Warsaw Treaty states, 22,000. And so on and so forth.

Moreover those who juggle with figures are supremely confident of being able to do so with impunity; they know that no self-respecting Soviet military leader, brought up in the tradition of defence of a " beleagured fortress," will try to persuade the West that our army is not as strong as its potential enemy imagines. (After all, secrecy can sometimes also be a "deterrent.")

Of course, there are in the West authoritative institutions and experts who give more or less objective appraisals of the correlation between the armed forces in the European theatre.

For instance, a recent report issued by the West German Social Democratic Party, pointed out that the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Treaty states is arrived at through incorrect methods of comparison. The NATO generals systematically "forget" to include in the numerical strength of the West the 250,000 French troops and also the Spanish army. Formally, this is understandable, for neither country belongs to the NATO military structure, but for the Warsaw Treaty countries these are two excellently equipped armies and not tin soldiers. Besides which it is quite clear on whose side they are.

The Western European Union (WEU) has just put out a report that has caused dismay and irritation in NATO quarters. And no wonder: it contains no mention "two-fold" preponderance in tanks is purely formal: 41 per cent of all NATO tanks minimum necessary for attack) of the Warsaw Treaty over NATO. And the "twofold" preponderance in tanks is purely formal: 41 per cent of all NATO tanks are models of the 1980s, whereas the Warsaw Treaty armoured force still includes many obsolete types and only 24 per cent were produced since 1970. At any rate that is what the compilers of the report say.

They also note the obvious superiority of NATO in anti-tank weapons and aircraft. Moreover the authors of the report consider the data on the arsenal of Soviet chemical weapons to be grossly exaggerated. The WEU concludes that "widely accepted statements of the West's hopeless disadvantage in conventional forces, or claims that Europe by itself is helpless before the Soviet threat are dangerous nonsense."

In general, Western Europe, with its population of 374 million, 100 million more than that of the East, and a considerably higher GNP, is not the poor defenceless orphan it is made out to be.

But let us assume what is highly improbable—that the Warsaw Treaty Organization is in every respect so much superior to NATO that from the standpoint of formal military logic it is capable of launching a sudden offensive.

For what purpose? To capture the little that would remain of Western Europe after the monstrous destruction wrought by hostilities? If the Soviet Union were really to embark on such an insane venture it would surely not be deferred by a few nuclear "warning shots," which, moreover, would most likely hit West European territory?

Besides, it is common knowledge that it would be enough to destroy only a few atomic power stations to make that territory uninhabitable for a long time to come.

Former NATO supreme commander in Europe Bernard Rogers did not venture to claim that an invasion from the East was a real threat. He saw the threat in something

else—in the Soviet Union allegedly being able without firing a single shot to bring Europe to its knees by blackmail, by intimidating it with the “gigantic” military might of the U.S.S.R.

But if all these years the Soviet Union—according to NATO logic—enjoyed superiority, why has it never tried to make use of it?

It is another matter that where real and not imaginary asymmetry exists it should be done away with. The Warsaw Treaty Organization proposes that this should be discussed, that the military doctrines of the two blocs be compared so as to be assured of their defensive character, and the structure of their armed forces, especially in zones where they adjoin, brought into line with purely defensive needs, and cut substantially.

Incidentally, West European leaders admit that if disproportions are done away with, the turn of the battlefield nuclear weapon will come. Let's hope it's not mere wishful thinking.

Here, too, the question of the role of nuclear deference arises.

The views voiced in Western Europe on the role of nuclear weapons in safeguarding security are by no means identical. Moreover of late the differentiation has become more marked, especially in connection with the INF treaty.

In France President Francois Mitterrand has voiced strong support for the Soviet-American treaty; the position taken by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is sceptical, while that of Defence Minister Andre Giraud, as we have seen, is frankly hostile. Nevertheless all three are unconditionally in favour of building up and modernizing the French “strike force” and opposed to the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe. On the other hand, growing sections of the French public are having doubts as to the expediency and reliability of “nuclear deterrence” and are in favour of France joining the disarmament process. The one-time “nuclear consensus” is clearly breaking down.

In Britain, alongside the “pro-nuclear” government, a powerful anti-nuclear opposition has emerged—Labour, the trade unions and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

The F.R.G. contributed to the conclusion of the INF treaty. However, the positions of the war office (Manfred Worner) and the foreign ministry (Hans-Dietrich Genscher) are far from identical. The former is a zealous proponent of strengthening the NATO “nuclear deterrent,” while the latter is in favour of safeguarding security primarily by political means and the elimination of mass destruction weapons in Europe through negotiations on the reduction of nuclear and conventional

armaments. Chancellor Helmut Kohl stands somewhere in between. A constructive programme of disarmament is advanced by the Social Democratic Party and the Greens.

Both in Britain and the F.R.G. committees of independent experts, consisting of representatives of different parties and scientists, have for several years now been working on the concept of a non-nuclear, non-offensive, reasonably sufficient “alternative defence.”

The coming reduction in the nuclear potentials of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. has given added impetus to debates in West European political circles on ways to ensure security.

Some are feverishly searching for ways of circumventing the INF treaty, devising “compensatory” variants through modernization of tactical nuclear armaments, and building up nuclear air force.

There is also another trend: the Soviet-American negotiations have given a new spur to the long-standing tendency towards strengthening the “self-reliant” defence of Western Europe that would be independent of the United States.

The many “voices of Europe”

Diverse projects for West European integration in the military sphere have been advanced time and again. Now in the form of strengthening the European section of NATO—witness the emergence of the bloc's Eurogroup in 1968. Now in timid attempts to give a military dimension to the EEC. Now within the WEU framework.

Gradually the choice appears to be inclining towards the Western European Union. This organization, which was founded in 1955 but which, with the exception of a few brief periods, played no significant role in European affairs, is now being revived.

In comparison with other variants, the WEU has many advantages: it comprises France, who withdrew from the NATO military structure in 1966, none of its members are neutral, it is smaller than NATO and the EEC (seven members as against sixteen and twelve respectively), and therefore more manageable.

France, the F.R.G., Britain, the Benelux countries and Italy are in favour of speeding up military integration within the WEU framework—although the degree of acceleration varies in each case. Jacques Delors, the French President of the Commission of the European Communities, has declared in support of these plans, regarding the WEU as a good link between the EEC and NATO.

The Hague session of the WEU Council held in October adopted a Platform on European Security Interests. It is based on a slightly amended version of a project advanced last year by Jacques Chirac.

The building of "European defence" has begun. Paris and Bonn, however, feel it is not proceeding fast enough and they have undertaken to accelerate the process. The F.R.G. and France are ahead of their EEC partners in many areas of cooperation, with the result that integration is developing, as it were, "at two speeds." Clearly the British, like the Greeks, the Spaniards and some others, are none too pleased by such a development, not wishing to be classed among the "second-rate" countries, particularly now when that development has extended to the military sphere.

January 1988 will see the 25th anniversary of the treaty between France and Federal Germany signed in Paris in 1963 by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. The treaty put paid in a way to the long-standing enmity. De Gaulle deemed it necessary to press for it, for a number of reasons: London rejected nuclear alliance with Paris in favour of the U.S.; Paris claims to an international standing equal to that of the U.S. were turned down by Washington; France's EEC partners did not support the French plans for a political alliance on the basis of the Common Market.

Much water has flowed under the bridges since then: the alignment of forces both on the world arena and in Western Europe has changed. Sharp contradictions have flared up more than once between France and the F.R.G., and the military articles of the treaty were forgotten. Today they are being reanimated, and the jubilee will be marked by the creation of a Franco-West German "defence council" and the formation of a joint brigade. It is said that the French Hades tactical nuclear missiles which are to replace the Plutons will be placed at its disposal under a system of joint control.

Talks on intensifying military cooperation, including cooperation in the nuclear field, are underway also between Paris and London. Andre Giraud has proposed to his opposite number George Younger that monthly consultations be held, as if this were an emergency situation. In London there are active advocates of extending Anglo-French cooperation in the nuclear sphere, all the way to combining their nuclear submarine fleets. But Britain's hands are tied by an agreement with the United States which forbids the sharing of nuclear secrets with third countries. However, times are changing. If the 50 per cent reduction in U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic weapons goes through, who knows but what Washington may have second thoughts about the expediency of continuing cooperation with Britain. Something of the kind almost happened at one time—when President Kennedy's advisers tried to persuade him to let the British nuclear forces "die a natural death." Were this to happen, nuclear cooperation with France would be on the agenda for London.

But London, for diametrically opposite reasons, is opposed to the Franco-West German experiment on the grounds that it sows confusion, distracts attention from NATO, and also from the realization of the WEU platform, which Britain regards primarily as a means of strengthening the "European mainstay" of NATO.

In other words, one can visualize a situation in the future when there would be formed an independent West European military structure based on the WEU, with its own "nuclear force" controlled jointly with the F.R.G.

Of course, projects are one thing and their realization is quite another. Italy, for instance, is anything but enthusiastic about the prospect of participating in a new military structure formed under the direction of Paris and Bonn. Spain (not a WEU member), on the contrary, has evinced interest in the idea of joining a Franco-West German military alliance, counting to take the edge off the anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments in the country.

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As for Washington, its position is clearly changing. Formerly any West European preoccupation with the idea of military independence met with a sharp rebuff from over the ocean. Today the U.S. attitude to both the Franco-West German project and the Hague decision of the WEU appears to be quite benevolent, probably as a surest means of bringing France back into the West's military fold, which, incidentally, it has never left completely, and make West Europeans shell out for military purposes.

How are we to react to all these projects? With indifference? Hardly, because they have a direct bearing on the European climate in general. Pour anathema on them? That is not likely to be effective, rather the reverse. We did try at one time to persuade ourselves and others that the WEU was stillborn, had no future.

The WEU is a reality and has to be taken for what it is, and, for one thing, contact with its bodies established (such contact has already been established with the WEU Assembly) and conduct a serious dialogue on European and world security.

The striving of the West Europeans to increase their independence vis-a-vis the U.S.A. through their own military integration is a reflection of many objective and subjective factors. So, it should not come as a surprise when an Italian Communist submits a resolution on consolidating "European defence," meaning that "far

from always and everywhere" West European and U.S. interests coincide. Incidentally, that reminds one of Adenauer's pronouncements.

Some see in a West European military structure a possible substitute for NATO, believing that the alliance is in its death throes. Opinion polls show that a lesser part of West Europeans favour maintaining military ties with the U.S. others hold that the WEU is a convenient means for coordinating the position of the West Europeans on fundamental military and political issues and exerting pressure on the U.S.A. Still others regard the WEU primarily as a place to work out a common stand towards the East. And there are those who consider it the optimal instrument for the conduct of military operations outside the geographical zone of NATO (the Persian Gulf is a case in point).

There is one more angle to this question. The activation of contacts between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. caused quite some alarm in some West European capitals, especially Paris and London, where it was feared that things might reach a point when West Germany would be "neutralized."

So, Paris visualizes the French-West German alliance as a bridle for keeping Bonn in check. And Bonn's cherished dream appears to be the co-owner, together with Paris, of the nuclear missile.

It seems that the initiators of the WEU resuscitation do not yet clearly see what concrete forms its military-political activity will take, whether it will gradually incorporate all EEC members and the two structures will effectively merge or it will remain a core, an exclusive grouping.

No one would venture to predict all the possible vicissitudes ahead, including the likely struggle for leadership within the WEU, or how the joint armed forces of a number of West European countries now being formed will interact with the agencies of the Union. A great many other things are still unclear.

Need we be perturbed by the advent of a new "military threat" for us? I am certain that the Soviet General Staff did not panic on learning of the plans to form a brigade of two French and two West German battalions, to which possibly a Spanish and even a Belgian battalion might be added. Allowing the F.R.G. to participate in control over nuclear weapons is another matter. It is inadmissible in any form whatever. The Soviet Union has made this quite plain on more than one occasion.

What is puzzling is not the appearance of a new brigade, but the tenacity of the old thinking. And that is regrettable.

Scanning the West European press one rarely fails to find panicky calls to parry the new "Soviet threat"—the threat of the neutralization of Western Europe. It looks very much as if what is feared now is not so much the "spectre of Communism" as the "spectre of neutralism" haunting Europe.

No mention is made of exactly what horrors neutralization is fraught with. Would it mean dissolving NATO? But the U.S.S.R. and its allies are ready on a reciprocal basis to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization, thereby in a sense, neutralizing themselves. Or perhaps "neutralization" implies doing away with the hostility to the socialist countries of the continent implanted by the right-wing political forces in Western Europe?

"Indeed, there are some on the conservative side of the political spectrum in Western Europe who would welcome the failure of Mr Gorbachev's reforms if only to regain the convenient, unifying threat perception of the past," Christoph Bertram, former director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, writes in Foreign Affairs.

There are, however, other forces as well. As Italian Socialist leader Bettino Craxi has pointed out "our Europe is not threatening anyone, and neither does any threat emanate from Eastern Europe."

Then why should the political and economic integration of Western Europe be supplemented with a sort of modern West European version of the Maginot Line? I do not question the right of Western Europe to attend to its defence capability on an individual or collective basis. Today the effective search for safeguards of national security should be conducted primarily on the plane of reducing the existing arsenals and working out political guarantees of universal security, with the establishment not of a balance of strength but a balance of interests as the objective.

True, many politicians in Western Europe are convinced that once Soviet-American negotiations are relatively successful it is essential to close ranks (in the military sense as well) so that the "superpowers" should have more respect for the positions and interests of the Europeans.

The desire of Western Europe to "speak with one voice," as de Gaulle put it, in order to be heard both in Washington and in Moscow is understandable. But it should not be forgotten that in formulating his concept of a future Europe, de Gaulle was speaking of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, on the basis of detente, concord and cooperation.

Moscow bears this in mind. In his talk with Mrs Thatcher on his way to Washington Mikhail Gorbachev assured the Europeans that not a single agreement detrimental to the interests of Europe would be concluded. And indeed, East and West Europeans were consulted thoroughly at all stages of the drafting of the INF treaty.

So, is it now high time the West Europeans joined more vigorously in the dialogue on problems of international security, instead of exaggerating their worries and apprehensions about the intentions of the two "superpowers," and advance substantive ideas on arms cuts rather than buildup? This, more than anything else, would enhance

security and trust in Europe and, for that matter, would help to overcome "the fear of ghosts" and "West European inferiority complex" if there is any.

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BELGIUM

Strategy After INF Agreement
52002432 Brussels *LA LIBRE BELGIQUE* in French
17 Nov 87 pp 1, 5

[Commentary by Pierre Cremer: "Strategy for the Post-Missile Era"]

[Text] A global strategy is not immutable, no more so than it is wrought in a twinkling of an eye and in the abstract. One might ask the question today: do not the recent, apparently divergent, perceptions of Americans and Europeans of the effects on our security of a partial denuclearization justify in time an adaptation of our common defense concept? For some people the planned disappearance of the Euromissiles followed by a subsequent 50 percent reduction of the strategic forces means only a simple return to the *status quo ante*. For others, this reasoning is seen as nothing but a dangerous illusion.

Let us first outline the premises of the problem. Notwithstanding the above mentioned force reduction, the United States is not giving up its space shield (SDI) at all; the tactical missiles (less than 500 kilometers) and anti-tactical missiles (ATBM) will remain in Europe; the French and the British are not giving up their own nuclear forces at all; and, finally, no agreement on the reduction of conventional capabilities proved to be possible.

These assumptions which are very plausible at least until about 2000, carry with them a series of political strategic considerations which will have to be taken into account if one wants to formulate a reliable defense concept for the future. Thus, we are forced to note first of all that even if it were to remain proportionately intact, the credibility of the United States strategic force would only decrease, if only because of an at least equal capability in the East, this time duly sanctioned by a treaty. Furthermore, the maintenance of an American will to develop a space shield, in addition to providing Europe with only hypothetical protection, will not prevent their being countered in time by Soviet anti-SDI measures. Moreover, it would put the brakes on a possible Soviet agreement to reduce its conventional capabilities asymmetrically as desired by the West. In a more denuclearized context, conventional weapons would become Moscow's main and sole instrument of security.

The fact that the Soviets are betting more and more on conventional weapons is confirmed by the evolution of the concepts they have recently expressed in their official writings, their training directives, and public professional debates. Thus, a war against NATO no longer necessarily needs to start with a massive nuclear action, nor with an escalating nuclear exchange. And, specifically, let us recall that reducing conventional forces is extremely difficult to do. There is already an abundance of phoney proposals. Simplistic pacifists and others are proposing such solutions as the elimination of specific

arms categories, for example tanks. They forget that, unlike the nuclear capability, a conventional capability does not consist solely of weapons. Equally important are geostrategic data, the deployment and linkage of the forces, their degree of training, the available logistics support, the quality of command, etc. Under those circumstances, no matter what the orientation may be of someone like Gorbachev, apparently the driving force behind a crucial economic recovery through a vigorous cleaning out of the Augian stables, the latent menace hanging over Europe will not be reduced for all that.

On the contrary. Even though less privileged, a Red Army reinforced and optimized by the "perestroika" will only be more effective. Faced with 300,000 GI's, European armies of unequal strength and probably conflicting wills to defend themselves in the face of danger, the red armada would probably not hesitate to assert its "ability to shift." The risk of disassociation between Europe and America could grow concomitantly. How is the West reacting already today?

The attitude of Mitterrand's France is significant in this regard. Perceiving those risks, its strategic objectives are becoming more Europeanized; its recent military overture to the FRG confirms this. But, on the other hand, those clear indications are accompanied by systematic reaffirmations of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance. For their part, the highest American authorities have recently been intensifying their efforts to demonstrate that nothing has changed in the strategic relationship, and that nothing will. No disarmament should shake the common confidence in a deterrent whose nature is unchanged.

But, faced with the subconscious European doubts, this bombastic faith does not dispel the uneasiness. In and of itself, the doubt would justify a concerted clarification between Europe as such and the United States. Whatever the confidence displayed, it is clear that Europe will have to adjust to a progressive shift of the intangible primacy of nuclear weapons to an advanced form of deterrent, that is to say to a firmer conventional response capability which would however, still and always, be implemented within a potential nuclear environment, be it primarily a European one.

Such a strengthened reliability could only be the fruit of a more advanced coordination, resulting in time in a veritable integration of the European capabilities. The WEO, in particular, should pursue its recent vague desires for a military dialogue. We should go in the direction of the development of a "strong European security core." In this regard, let us have the courage to say "no" to those who would like to join that "strong core" prematurely. He who embraces too much, does not embrace well. As a matter of fact, the important thing is quickly to have a valid, thus united, interlocutor at one's disposal in the face of America. For her it does not serve any purpose to talk about a "European pillar" within the Alliance if it does not exist. But there is more. It will be

up to Europe, the most affected party, to take the initiative for any new Western strategic dialogue which sooner or later will be necessary. The newly created context gives it the right and the duty to do so. It must say what the requirements of its security are. Consequently, its first action should be internal reflection. Could one hope for that much?

For lack of a revised strategy taking into account the changed relationship of forces, and thus of responsibilities, within the Alliance Europe will have no other choice than to rely on a strategic nuclear dependence even though it has sensed the uncertain character of it.

8463

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher, Shevardnadze Give Dinner Speeches

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[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Eduard Shevardnadze today declared their readiness to intensify German-Soviet relations. At a dinner in honor of the Soviet foreign minister at the Godesberg redoubt, Genscher said, among other things:

“Tomorrow we will sign a protocol on consultations. This is a significant qualitative step which gains in importance because of the time it is taking place. It will give the bilateral dialogue further depth and constancy. The agreement is an expression of the common awareness that there is no alternative to cooperation between all states. However, it also expresses the responsibility which the FRG and the Soviet Union bear...

“The time has come to talk about setting up cultural institutes as well. Whoever is familiar with the culture of other peoples will gain access to their soul. Getting to know one another and mutual respect for cultural achievements leads to a reduction of hostile images. It leads to understanding, which we need for the peaceful coexistence of the peoples of Europe...

“Our goal must be to create more security with fewer weapons and to overcome the division of our continent step by step. Yesterday evening you told me the time is ripe for this. We have decided to act in accordance with this recognition and with this responsibility.

“We are following the internal developments in your country with great attention. Your efforts for reform in the Soviet Union find understanding and sympathy in our country. We expect that an economically and socially reformed Soviet Union will be more open toward the outside world and internally.

“For this reason we consider it important that the principle of glasnost will also be applied to the Soviet Union's relations with the Western world.

“Soviet citizens should be able to inform themselves in more detail about the West, about the living conditions prevailing there, and about its political ideas.

“The basic principle that he who has more must disarm more is universally valid. Effective verification by on-the-spot inspections must become a firm part of the range of instruments for arms control policy. We welcome the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty within the first half of this year on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear potentials. The swift conclusion of an agreement on the global removal of chemical weapons also has particular urgency. These terrible weapons must disappear completely once and for all. During the negotiations we came so close to one another that by the joint efforts of all concerned the conclusion of the treaty now seems achievable...

“Nuclear weapons with a range of under 500 km are of particular significance for us Germans. The Soviet and U.S. land-based nuclear short-range missiles are included in NATO's concept of arms control. The Federal Government will continue to work for a mandate for such negotiations. Our goal is in accordance with the declaration of the NATO Council in Reykjavik, the significant and verifiable reduction of these nuclear systems to equal upper limits.”

The Soviet foreign minister stated in his dinner speech, which DPA received in a translation by the Soviet Embassy, among other things:

“Mr Minister, I felt the desire in what you said to give new interpretations to the traditional aspects of our relations. We welcome such an approach. It is in accordance with the thought expressed to your country's president by M.S. Gorbachev that 'there is a possibility of rethinking relations between our two countries—we are ready to do this'. Supporting the idea of more solid relations between the FRG and the USSR, which would be of truly historic significance, we do not call for a revision of our roles and places in the social orders and alliances chosen by us. Everything can and should remain as it is up to joint efforts for strengthening stability in relations between our countries, which as M.S. Gorbachev said, means stability in Europe.

“Cooperation which is based on mutual respect and the respecting of existing realities and efforts to pay maximum regard to mutual interests can only have good prospects. The experiences gained in the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow teach us this. We must use to the fullest the enormous possibilities contained in this document and continue to make progress so a new quality will be created in our bilateral...

“We support the complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons which would correspond to the basic interests of all Europeans. Of course, such a solution to this issue is only possible with the participation of the other

nuclear powers and it is not our fault that they are not yet ready to do this. Therefore, one could at least start discussing in future negotiations on the reduction of forces and conventional arms in Europe the issue of dual purpose carriers. The nuclear components themselves could be made the subject of relevant negotiations in the future without drawing things out.

"The issue of a ban on chemical weapons is extremely acute. It does not require any great intelligence to recognize which countries could become the objects of a chemical attack. In this context one wonders why hindrances to concluding the convention of banning chemical weapons are being constructed by a country which knows and is 100 percent sure that these weapons will not be used on its territory..."

"We are ready for negotiations on the problem of conventional arms, and we are interested in whether we can count on an accommodating, constructive readiness on the part of our Western European partners.

"Here, too, much depends on the position of the FRG..."

"In my thoughts on the relationship between traditions and renewal I recalled the outstanding piece of advice to his contemporaries by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: 'Make efforts not to be beneath your epoch.' That is also a piece of advice to us to live in this century which is so perilous to all living things. In following this piece of advice we shall demonstrate our loyalty to the humanistic European tradition and announce political renewal."

NETHERLANDS

Commentator on Soviet Superiority in Conventional Forces

52002433 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch
30 Nov 87 p 8

[Article by Frits Schaling: "It Is Primarily a Psychological Threat"]

[Text] "The superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and their capacity for a surprise attack and large scale offensive action are a point of particular concern (...)"

This was one of the crucial points in the "platform" adopted by the ministers of foreign affairs of the seven members of the Western European Union (WEU) during their meeting in the Hague on 27 October of this year. Today is the opening day of the annual—31st—session of the WEU Assembly being held in the Palais d'Iena in Paris. The platform is a direct result of the call issued a year ago by French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to draw up a "security charter" for Europe.

The WEU Assembly will undoubtedly ratify this platform during its meeting, which will last until and including Thursday, but is still occupied with numerous other

controversial problems: the possible expansion of the organization with the inclusion of such countries as Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece, the establishment of real headquarters in a single capital instead of the now existing parcelling out of WEU institutions between Paris and London, the status of the joint brigade sought by both France and the Federal Republic of Germany, etcetera.

One of the interesting documents to be studied this week by the Assembly deals with the question which became acute last year following the unexpected summit meeting between President Reagan and Party Leader Mikhail Gorbachev: how threatening is the Soviet Union for Europe following the elimination of the medium range missiles and, at a later stage, half of the strategic attack weapons? In other words: how watertight is the United States' guarantee to maintain its 340,000 troops in Europe in the light of increasing pressure from the American people and in the Congress to lighten the financial burden resulting from that "commitment."

As far as the latter is concerned, it would seem that the Europeans do not need to be too concerned: whenever the occasion arises, American officials visiting Europe assure profusely that it is not only in the West European interest, but especially also in the American interest that those troops be here, that the emotional ties between the United States and Europe are unbreakable, that the security of Europe begins at the Pacific Ocean coast, etcetera.

The Europeans nevertheless remain uncomfortable about the idea that a step on the escalation ladder is being eliminated and that soon there will be no nuclear means which make the direct coupling of the American and European security interest obvious. As a matter of fact, that means that the "gray area" between, on the one hand, conventional weapons and the so controversial nuclear battlefield weapons and, on the other hand, the strategic retaliation weapons, the putting into service of which is extremely doubtful, will have to be completely filled by conventional weapons where it has been noted that the Soviet Union has an alarming superiority in its possession.

But how great is that Soviet superiority really? This is something they have been at loggerheads over for decades at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, without being able to agree on the totals to be attributed to both sides, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The report from the WEU Committee on Defense Problems and Armament being discussed this week in Paris has reached rather remarkable conclusions in this regard: specifically that the superiority of the Warsaw Pact is being rather grossly exaggerated, that to a large extent the function of the about 535,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Europe is to demonstrate Soviet power

in the face of unwilling regimes, and that the dependability of those regimes' troops in times of war would be highly doubtful. The report lists a number of sober facts:

- the ratio of the population between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries is 1 to 1.5, thus a superiority for NATO; the extent to which the people specifically of the Soviet Union are "technically competent" and speak Russian fluently goes down absolutely and relatively;
- there is no comparison between the economic power of the Soviet Union and its bloc countries and the United States and its West European NATO partners, once again a superiority for NATO;
- in a large number of areas the NATO countries have a clear superiority in terms of technological renewal and the application of new techniques in conventional warfare;
- although the Warsaw Pact has twice as many tanks as NATO, there are "substantial differences" in terms of age and "sophistication": whereas 40 percent of the NATO tanks (which number more than 14,000) date from after 1980 [translator's note: date not clear on original], more than 80 percent of the Warsaw Pact tanks date from the decades preceding 1970. As a matter of fact, the T54/55, dating from 1947, make up 40 percent of the Soviet tank force.

The report notes that this means that "when you take certain qualitative factors into account... the total picture is somewhat less unfavorable for NATO" than would seem to be the case based on number comparisons.

Hence there really is no Soviet threat at all? The WEU Committee, led by the British conservative member of parliament John Stokes, did not go that far at all. Even though they warn that estimates of the military strength of the Warsaw Pact should not be exaggerated "for political reasons," the report concludes that "... the level of those fighting forces cannot be justified today by any kind of legitimate defense needs at all." In order to achieve a more objective assessment of the Soviet threat in the future, the report suggests that the satellite projects so far developed separately by Great Britain, the Federal Republic and France, be joined together in order to develop a "collective European capability" in the gathering of reliable intelligence as a counterbalance against the American activity in this area developed primarily by the CIA.

It is to be expected that this report will cause a few frowns in Paris this week, if not an annoyed shrugging of the shoulders. As a matter of fact, these sobering conclusions arrive at a politically not very favorable moment, just as the West European democracies are thinking about the negotiations to be conducted on the military superiority which the WEU Committee has put into

perspective. Also just at a moment when Party Leader Gorbachev seems inclined to make concessions in the conventional area in order to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition to the INF treaty within the American Senate.

It may well be that the greatest threat emanating from the Soviet Union in this era of "perestroika" and "glasnost" is not even military but rather psychological: even if Gorbachev were to offer to withdraw 4 of the 31 Soviet divisions, plus 1,200 of the 13,000 tanks from Eastern Europe, that should not necessarily lead to a greater sense of security in Western Europe.

As a matter of fact, the sense of insecurity is primarily caused by the knowledge that there are Europeans living on the other side of the Iron Curtain for whom, in many cases, life means a tough struggle for a minimal bit of prosperity, for whom in many cases freedom of movement is limited to within their borders, and whose freedom of expression does not go beyond a letter sent to the party newspaper—assuming that it is published. It is only when the threat of the imposition of such a social model has disappeared that West Europeans will be able to sleep peacefully.

8463

PORUGAL

NATO Seen Protecting Europe in Light of INF Agreement

52002435 Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese
12 Dec 87 p 2

[Editorial by Victor Cunha Rego] is NATO and the American troops stationed along the Iron Curtain. As long as they are there, Moscow will not be able to take over Western Europe without using tactical nuclear weapons—which is unthinkable because Washington would not permit the death of tens of thousands of its soldiers.

As long as NATO's conventional forces are what they still are and the USA does not abdicate its position of strategic nuclear superpower, the rule of law will continue to exist.

In comparison to Western Europe the USSR, in terms of economics and social organization, is 50 years behind. All resources have been concentrated in the military-industrial complex, but this no longer succeeds in pulling the other sectors ahead nor in competing against the qualitative jump forward of the American Strategic Defense Initiative. The USSR does not have the financial or technological capacity to invest in star wars while at the same time meeting the minimum requirements of a Western society.

When satellite television reaches its territory, it will be impossible to continue to delude the Soviet people, beginning with the Russians. The chasm that separates housing, transport, roads, hospitals, schools—not to mention the consumer goods so avidly sought after in the entire East—between the East and the West will be impossible to hide. Moscow must urgently improve the life of the peoples under its Empire, or within a half dozen years it will have no alternative but war or revolution.

War would only be possible if the USA resorts to a policy of isolation and strategic nuclear capitulation, which is not likely without the collapse of the Western financial and commercial system. It is enough that Washington succeed in erecting a coherent fiscal policy for the uncertainties regarding the future of global demand, interest rates and exchange rates to end. The USSR cannot base its future on the sudden economic collapse of the USA.

The dismanteling of the intermediate range missiles and the reduction in strategic nuclear weapons benefit both superpowers. The USA because it permits, in theory, a strengthening of the economy. The USSR because, in addition to freeing up funds needed for civilian society, a portion of its nuclear power was already inoperable.

As long as NATO exists Europe will be protected. Initiatives that could help the pro-Western Russians—like Gorbachev who is in fact, as Thatcher and Soares say, a courageous and determined leader—are concretely attainable initiatives favoring peace so long as this peace does not encourage the Russian dream of world conquest.

The question is this. The Russians fear war because their leaders know the vulnerability of the military apparatus, which is less backwards than civilian society but nevertheless shows enormous overall gaps. But the Russians continue—like all great underdeveloped empires—to pursue the dream of world conquest. If this agreement, beneficial for the economies of both sides, is followed by others which, in the short term, reduce the conventional forces of NATO or the capacity of American long range missiles (it is ingenuous to believe in an efficient system of verifying the dismanteling of missiles on USSR territory or on Soviet submarines), we will have witnessed this week the beginning of a disaster in which Europe would be the first victim. Let us be optimists for the time being. Let us hope not.

13026/7310

TURKEY

Openness in Nuclear Policy Discussed
52002440 *Istanbul CUMHURIYET* in Turkish
5 Jan 88 pp 1, 13

[Hasan Cemal editorial: "Turkey's Nuclear Policy"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that Turkey's foreign policy is entering an interesting stage. In view of this, it is understood that the nuclear policy Ankara has been pursuing will

soon come to light. There have been increasing signs that Washington's and NATO's demands will gradually force Turkey into a difficult position. It seems that the diplomatic pressure directed against Turkey will gradually be intensified. What is the reason for this?

According to a report which Ufuk Guldemir has sent from Washington, there are two reasons. The first is related to Turkey's geographical position, the second is the docile nature of Turkish public opinion. William Arkin, director of the National Security Program of the Political Studies Institute in Washington, has said the following:

"What Washington takes into consideration prior to suggesting nuclear programs to countries like the FRG, Spain, and Britain is the public opinion in those countries. The question of public opinion is a definite factor. In Turkey's case, Washington is interested in the views of the officials, not in what the Turkish people may say. Consequently, the U.S. nuclear arms and military units that are based in Greece will gradually be transferred to Turkey. There is no need to adopt special decisions in that regard. Due to the fact that a move will not be made to modernize the only nuclear artillery unit and the only nuclear air base in Greece, both will gradually become obsolete. Turkey, however, is carrying out a systematic modernization program. Apart from the base at Incirlik, nuclear depots exist at bases at Balikesir, Erhac, Murted, and Eskisehir, which are controlled by Turkey. Everyone's attention has been focused on Turkey because of the absence of the public opinion factor. Of course, Turkey also has a disadvantageous geographical position: It has a common border with the Soviet Union and is close to the Iran-Iraq war zone. Furthermore, the U.S. bases in Turkey are its closest ones to the Gulf region. Consequently, the Pentagon regards Turkey as a potential partner in the Middle East and in any nuclear contingency plans. My view is that the nuclear pressure on Turkey will increase."

We believe that there is nothing more to add to all this. It is easy to say that the diplomatic pressure directed against Turkey in the nuclear domain will gradually be intensified, but what will Ankara do? It is common knowledge that various alternatives are being discussed behind closed doors in the Turkish capital at the present time.

The Turkish people have the right to be informed on developments which are vitally important from the point of view of our national defense. Final decisions in that regard cannot be adopted behind closed doors. Neither the people nor the parliament should be kept in the dark.

We hope that both the ruling and opposition parties will be sensitive and vigilant on the question of nuclear policy, which closely concerns our national security.

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